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(1) Introduction 
 
Should the family home be afforded special protection from creditors? Many would 
instinctively argue that the family home is a special type of property because it plays 
such a central role in our everyday lives. However, when attempts are made to 
translate this impulse towards safeguarding our family homes into clear law and 
policy, it becomes apparent that the issues surrounding creditors and the concept of 
family home are complex and complicated by the nature of the interests at the heart of 
the argument: the ‘family’, the ‘home’, and the commercial claims of creditors. This 
article considers the practical and theoretical implications of family home analysis on 
policies governing disputes between occupiers and ‘non-home’ interests, such as 
those of third party creditors, and asks whether the concept of family home, as 
currently reflected in English law, provides the most suitable vehicle by which to 
achieve any ‘special protection’ deemed appropriate.  
We know that the idea of ‘family home’ is a significant aspect of the 
phenomenon of ‘home’, both in the popular consciousness, and in legal domains. For 
instance, empirical studies focusing on the meaning and values of home have 
indicated that ‘family home’, as a special type of property, is conceptually significant. 
The significance of family cuts across many of the values that emerge from 
qualitative studies on the meanings of home.1 Inferences extrapolated from occupiers’ 
responses have included the propositions that: ‘…it is the presence of children and the 
activity of family life that makes a house into a home.’;2 and that the family home is: 
‘…a projection and basis of identity, not only of an individual but also of the 
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family.’3 This may exacerbate the effects of losing one’s home, since the research has 
indicated that function of home as a ‘place of security and protection’ becomes even 
more significant to occupiers when the property is a family home shared with 
children.4 These associations raise interesting issues concerning the legal protection 
of the owner-occupied home - a question which is brought into sharp relief is when 
creditors seek recourse to mortgage possession actions and other remedies to enforce 
their security interests against domestic property.   
If the law is concerned to recognize ‘home’ values in this context, a number of 
models are available. In some jurisdictions, for example, in certain Canadian 
provinces and some states of the USA, homestead provisions provide an explicit and 
systematic scheme of legal protection by exempting the home – to a greater or lesser 
extent – from the pool of assets which creditors may access to recoup their losses on 
default. In others, including New Zealand and Ireland, legislation regulates dealings 
affecting the home by requiring the consent of certain family members in order to 
validate security, and other transactions. In England and Wales, a more ad hoc 
approach to the protection of home has emerged, with provisions scattered across 
matrimonial homes legislation, bankruptcy legislation, and provisions dealing with 
co-owned property or charging orders. While the more explicit approaches attest more 
obviously to prevailing policy choices, the ad hoc nature of policies protecting the 
family home in English law has tended to obscure their overall effects. However, 
although the nature and degree of any protection conferred on home occupiers against 
creditors varies significantly, the instinct to safeguard the home, and to acknowledge 
that a home is not identical to other types of property, is a common feature.      
Nevertheless, within each system, a further dichotomy exists, between policies 
that seek to protect the family home, by focusing on the family unit, often typified by 
 2
the conjugal relationship, and those which value home per se, thus also recognising 
the interests of individual occupiers in their homes. Although English law does not 
systematically treat the family home as a ‘protected territory’, evidence can be found 
of policies focusing on both family home and home per se. Between these options, the 
tendency of both legislature and judiciary appears to favour a ‘family unit’ approach, 
rather than focusing on the interests of individual occupiers in the home per se. This is 
indicative of the implicit socio-cultural values informing legal decision-making in this 
area, yet while this proclivity towards a ‘special protection’ for the family home is 
readily comprehensible, it raises a number of significant and controversial issues. 
First, adopting ‘family home’ as the relevant unit of analysis, rather than ‘occupier of 
the home’, necessitates a delineation of the relationships that qualify as ‘family’ for 
these purposes. What’s more, however broadly these relationships might be defined, a 
sole occupier clearly cannot establish a family home in this context since ‘family’ 
essentially involves relationships between individuals. This approach also excludes 
single parents who are sole adult owner-occupiers, living in a property with children. 
Difficult questions may arise even when a property qualifies as a ‘family home’. By 
focusing on the collective interests of the family unit it is presumed that family 
members have a unitary interest in the home. Individual occupiers may have a range 
of different interests in a single property: one or more of the adult occupiers will be 
the owner(s); amongst joint owners, at least one, but possibly more, will be the 
debtor; others may be non-debtor occupiers, including children, who generally have 
no legal interest in the property. When these interests are aggregated into one ‘family 
unit’, the individual needs and interests of less powerful family members may be 
overlooked. This is particularly apparent when the concept of family home is viewed 
through the lens of feminist theoretical analysis, as the marriage between the concept 
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of family and the concept of home, twin pillars of the ‘private sphere’, may be 
regarded as compounding the gendered nature of the family home.  
However, critical analysis of the concept of ‘family home’ is complicated by 
the way in which both concepts – ‘Home’ and ‘Family’ - tend to be culturally 
idealized. The idea that the home ought to attract greater protection because it is a 
meaningful site for family life is a potent one, since: ‘[t]he home as a social concept is 
strongly linked with a notion of family - the parental home, the marital home, the 
ancestral home.’;5 and this has been linked with positive attachments to a property, so 
that: ‘…‘home’ conjures up such images as personal warmth, comfort, stability and 
security, it carries a meaning beyond the simple notion of a shelter.’6 There is a 
danger, however, that the idealism surrounding ‘family home’ makes objective 
analysis of the values that it represents, more difficult to achieve.7 From a practical 
perspective, it is argued that the focus on family in the English provisions has been 
unhelpful in avoiding forced sale at the hands of creditors. In addition, the application 
of a family-oriented framework reinforces an undesirable ethos of female dependency 
and invisibility within the home. Criticisms of family-centric analysis in this context 
are also supported by analysis of the relationship between family and home in other 
disciplines.  
The article proceeds to consider whether it would be preferable for any special 
status conferred on the home in law to be detached from a ‘family unit’ analysis and 
rooted in an alternative, individual-oriented framework. Aspects of this individual 
approach, which recognizes the value of home per se, and the discrete interests of 
individual family members, as well as the value of home to the family as a collective 
unit, have emerged in recent years when the protection of the domestic property has 
been discussed by Parliament, by the judiciary, and by the Law Commission. This 
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article considers the benefits of adopting an individual-oriented approach when 
framing the legal protection of the home, and argues that recognising the interests of 
individuals – including individual family members – in their homes would be both 
theoretically sound, and practically advantageous.  
(2) The concept of home in English law 
Since English law has not adopted a systematic scheme for the protection of the 
(family) home against third parties, it has been suggested that the concept means 
relatively little in English law.8 However, although disputes between creditors and 
occupiers are characterized by a general pro-creditor, pro-sale tendency, there are 
instances in which the family home appears to be regarded as a ‘protected territory’.9 
On other occasions, the interests of individual family members become the focus, 
although the context of the family unit remains necessary. The interests of individual 
occupiers in the home per se, rather than the family home, have attracted less 
attention.  This section considers the ways in which the ad hoc provisions governing 
actions against domestic property in English law have shifted between these 
paradigms, and argues where the concept of family home has prevailed, it has tended 
to hinder, rather than help, the interests of both individual family members, and the 
family unit as a whole, when seeking to preserve the home against forced sale.  
(a) Family Home 
The Matrimonial Homes legislation10 was initially launched as an initiative to provide 
systematic protection for the matrimonial or family home, over and above non-family 
property, as a response to the fact that English law: ‘…[did] not, as does the law in 
many places (particularly in the USA and Canada), recognize a ‘homestead’ right of 
the wife, nor does it give the wife of a bankrupt any preference or priority - perhaps it 
ought to do so…’11 In the words of Lord Denning, the law should protect the ‘poor 
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ignorant wife’.12 When the matrimonial homes legislation was enacted, this protection 
took the form of conferring a ‘right of occupation’ on ‘non-owning spouses’.13 
However, despite subsequent amendments, these provisions remain limited both in 
scope and, since the non-owning spouse’s rights do not bind third parties unless they 
have been registered as a charge,14 applicability.  
Nonetheless, where ad hoc attempts to confer some legal protection on the 
home have emerged within general property law principles, the tension between 
individual and family-oriented perspectives has frequently emerged. One illustration 
can be found in the seminal decision in Williams and Glyn’s Bank Ltd v Boland 
(hereafter Boland)15 and the policy debates that followed. Boland concerned the 
interpretation of section 70(1)(g) of the Land Registration Act 1925, a property law 
provision designed to protect the interests of individuals who occupied property.16 
The implications of section 70(1)(g) in relation to family homes were highlighted by 
the decision in Boland,17 when the House of Lords refused to grant possession of the 
family home to a mortgagee following default, because the debtor’s wife – who had 
not been joined in the mortgage transaction - had an equitable interest and was in 
actual occupation. However, rather than providing a special protection, this merely 
raised the standard of protection for wives in family homes to the level afforded to all 
other occupiers.  
The decision in Boland confirmed that section 70(1)(g) applied equally to all 
persons in actual occupation of property, regardless of their relationship to the legal 
owner. Previously, although non-spouse co-occupiers had been entitled to claim 
overriding status under section 70(1)(g),18 spouses who shared occupation of the 
property had been excluded on the grounds that the wife’s occupation was a ‘mere 
shadow’ of her husband’s occupation.19 Although this no longer represents good law, 
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the pre-Boland position is a cautionary example of one of the dangers associated with 
a concept of home that is defined in relation to the family unit in occupation: one 
partner, typically a female partner, may become ‘invisible’ to the law, and so left 
without protection against third party claims. In Boland, Lord Wilberforce adopted a 
pragmatic, gender-neutral, and individualistic approach to the question, stating clearly 
that: ‘[o]ccupation, existing as a fact, may protect rights if the person in occupation 
has rights.’20 Spouses were no longer barred from asserting their equitable interests in 
actual occupation as ‘overriding interests’ merely because of their status as spouses,21 
and the focus of the provision was redirected towards the protection of individual 
occupiers. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note the re-emergence of a desire to protect 
family home, rather than home per se in policy discourses following Boland. When 
the Law Commission reviewed the implications of the decision, it proposed limiting 
overriding status to spouses in occupation, rather than all occupiers on the basis that 
the law: ‘…has long recognized the need to protect wives in their enjoyment of their 
property and the matrimonial property, and has developed a growing regard for their 
position.’22 Discussion in the House of Lords followed a similar slant, as Lord Simon 
argued that the ‘integrity’ of the family home is ‘of great social importance’,23 while 
Lord McGregor welcomed steps to: ‘…secure and safeguard the values which society 
upholds in the institution of marriage and the family.’24 Although these proposals 
were withdrawn due to lack of time in the parliamentary calendar, it is interesting to 
note that when the initiative was re-launched, albeit unsuccessfully, in 1985,25 the 
exclusion of ‘non-spouse’ individuals who occupied the ‘family’ home, such as: 
‘…grandma, the mother-in-law, and possibly the common law wife’26 was asserted as 
an argument against a more narrowly defined provision. 
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The idea of providing a special protection for the family home also emerged in 
the context of another property law provision, section 30 of the Law of Property Act 
1925 (LPA). Section 30 of the LPA allowed a third party, such as a secured creditor, 
to apply for the sale of co-owned land. The judicial power to order sale was 
discretionary, however, since the land was held on a ‘trust for sale’, the courts 
generally tended to order sale when it was requested. Section 30 did not make any 
special provision for family homes, however, in a series of cases the court exercised 
its discretion to refuse sale on the grounds that the property was occupied as a family 
home. In Stevens v Hutchinson,27 Upjohn J stated that despite his opinion that the 
debtor was a ‘ne’er-do-well and a waster’,28 unlikely to make good on his debts, a 
forced sale of the property would be ‘unjust’ since it would result in turning an 
innocent wife out of her home. Subsequent cases suggested that the court’s tendency 
to favour sale could be tempered in cases involving matrimonial homes by the fact 
that: ‘…the house should be used as a home for the two of them.’29 When the 
collateral purpose doctrine was adopted by the Court of Appeal in Re Evers’ Trust,30 
the court emphasized its: ‘…great regard [for] the fact that the house is bought as a 
home in which the family is to be brought up.’31  
These decisions are suggestive of the court’s tendency to treat the family home 
as a special type of property, with a higher degree of immunity against forced sale by 
creditors than other properties. Nevertheless, this apparent attempt to confer special 
status on the family home was ultimately unsuccessful. The failure of this judicial 
initiative can be attributed, in part at least, to the strong pro-creditor and pro-sale 
stance that characterizes decisions in this context. In addition, however, it is arguable 
that one of the weaknesses of the doctrine was its focus on the ‘family home’, rather 
than the individual interests of the family members who occupied the property as a 
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home. The basis of the collateral purpose doctrine was the retention of the property 
for the purpose for which it had been purchased. When that perceived purpose was 
occupation by the family unit, the court reasoned, this purpose would only continue to 
subsist for as long as the family unit remained intact. When one family member left 
the home, the court held that the family unit and, consequently, the collateral purpose 
of occupation as a family home, no longer existed.32 The interests of individual family 
members, and their desire to continue living in the property as a home, were 
disregarded.  
This reasoning was also extended to include cases where the family unit 
remained intact, but one member of the family incurred a charge against the property, 
as the court held that this, also, revoked the original purpose of occupation as a family 
home.33 While it is clearly the case, and arguably appropriate, that ‘family-type’ 
considerations are less persuasive in the context of disputes involving third party 
creditors, the use of collateral purpose analysis in the context of creditor applications 
(albeit without accepting that the purpose survived the transaction) perpetuated the 
idea that the use of the property as a home was only relevant so long as no individual 
family member disrupted the continuity of the shared occupation, and no third party 
transactions took place affecting the property. Ultimately, the irony of the ‘family 
unit’ approach in the collateral purpose doctrine was that the family home was only 
protected if there was no dispute to be resolved.  
Furthermore, even a successful outcome at this stage could leave the occupiers 
of the (family) home facing the ultimate prospect of bankruptcy proceedings.34 When 
an order for sale was requested by a trustee in bankruptcy, the court typically 
reasoned from the premise that: ‘[b]ankrutpcy has, in relation to the matrimonial 
home, its own claim to protection.’;35 since the trustee in bankruptcy’s duty to realize 
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assets for the benefit of the bankrupt’s creditors outweighed any possible inclination 
to safeguard the family home. It is interesting, however, to note the elevation of the 
family home in the enactment of counterbalancing legislative provisions: ‘…to 
alleviate the personal hardships of those who are dependent on the debtor but not 
responsible for his insolvency.’36 The legislature’s concern was with other members 
of the family unit, since: ‘…eviction from the family home…may be a disaster not 
only to the debtor himself…but also to those who are living there as his 
dependents.’37  
The focus on dependency rather than the needs or interests of individual 
occupiers is a significant aspect of the ‘family unit’ approach. In the bankruptcy 
context, this reasoning distinguishes the protection of a debtor (the wrongdoer) from 
the protection of the debtor’s dependents (who may be regarded as innocent victims 
of the bankrupt’s default),38 making it attractive to those who support the idea that 
home attracts special protection, but are concerned about the merits of elevating a 
debtor’s interests over those of the creditor. When the dependent in question is a 
child, this framework presents little difficulty, but where partners – usually wives – 
are concerned, the dependency analysis is problematic. Furthermore, it is clear that a 
presumption of adult female dependency was at the root of the protection. The debates 
that preceded the enactment of the Insolvency Act 1986 revealed an intrinsic 
assumption that the male partner would be the bankrupt, and that the female partner 
and any children would be dependent on the male partner.39 The continual use of the 
feminine person was accompanied by an assumption that, in the event of repossession, 
she would be more severely affected: ‘…she risks not only losing the income from 
her breadwinner and facing the humiliation that bankruptcy inevitably brings, but she 
will be penalized in practice more heavily than almost anyone else by losing the 
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matrimonial home.’40 The personal hardships attendant to bankruptcy: anxiety, 
financial straits and social consequences; were regarded as acting more on the female 
dependent than the male bankrupt, thus implying the proposition, heavily criticized by 
feminist theorists,41 that the home is the woman’s domain, yet she remains dependent 
on a male breadwinner to provide. 
However, even within this family home provision, elements of a more 
individualistic model are discernible. Section 336 of the Insolvency Act 1986 
provided that when dealing with a dwelling house comprised in the bankrupt’s estate 
in which a spouse has registered rights under the matrimonial homes provisions, or 
where the bankrupt and his spouse or former spouse held the property as trustees for 
sale,42 while section 335A made similar provision for property that was co-owned 
under a trust of land.43 In each case, when exercising its discretion to sell the 
bankrupt’s family home, the court was directed, when exercising its discretion to 
order sale, to make such order as it thinks just and reasonable having regard to a range 
of factors including the needs and financial resources of the spouse or former spouse, 
and the needs of any children. This provision does enable the court to recognize 
individual interests, although the property must first be identified as a ‘family home’ – 
that is: ‘…a dwelling house which is or has been the home of the bankrupt or the 
bankrupt’s spouse or former spouse…’44 The reference to the needs of children as 
individual stake holders in the home is preferable to subsuming, at the risk of 
obscuring, their interests within the family unit, but the benefit of the bankruptcy 
provision is limited in a number of respects.  
Firstly, case law on the exercise of the court’s discretion under sections 336 
and 335A of the Insolvency Act 1986, indicates that overarching pro-creditor position 
of the English courts has been persistently decisive: the circumstances must be 
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exceptional before a court will refuse to order sale,45 and only the most extreme 
situations – not including the mere presence of children46 - have been regarded as 
exceptional, and so justified delaying the sale of the family home.47 Although the 
degree of protection conferred on the ‘family home’ by sections 336 and 335A is 
limited, it is also significant to acknowledge that the scope of any purported 
protection is curtailed by the threshold requirement of a ‘family home’, defined by 
reference to the bankrupt and the bankrupt’s spouse. Although it might be argued that 
the need to establish a ‘family home’ before the court’s discretion arises provides a 
convenient means of determining which individuals should be included within any 
protection, one consequence is that the court has no discretion to take account of the 
needs of children living in non-marital families, however exceptional the 
circumstances may be. Although the court can consider the needs of particular 
individuals, the discretion only arises in a family home context.     
A further illustration of the difficulties underpinning the application of the 
concept of family home can be found in the charging orders context. The Charging 
Orders Act 1979 provided a legal route through which an unsecured creditor could 
secure a debt on the debtor’s property, ex post facto, thus acquiring the status of 
secured creditor. Significantly, with the status of secured creditor comes locus standi 
to request an order for the sale of the property.48 The acquisition of a charging order, 
which is clearly a significant step towards forcing the sale of the property, lies within 
the court’s discretion. The notion that family homes should attract special protection is 
indicated in a line of authorities identifying matrimonial occupation as a relevant 
factor in the exercise of this discretion. The tendency towards family home analysis in 
this context highlights, once again, the implications of focusing on family status rather 
than individual occupiers’ interests. These issues were most clearly brought out in 
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Harman v Glencross,49 where Ewbank J described Mrs Glencross - who was a joint 
owner of the property as well as an occupier and the debtors’ spouse - as having a 
claim on the basis of her status as a wife. As a wife, the court held she had a: 
‘…common law…right to be maintained and housed during the marriage…’; a right 
which: ‘…arises from the status of the marriage itself.’50 The Court of Appeal 
concurred with this analysis, and accepted Mrs Glencross’s status as a spouse, and the 
fact that the property concerned was a matrimonial home,51 as part of the ‘personal 
circumstances of the debtor’.52 The court focused on Mrs Glencross’s position as the 
debtor’s wife, and therefore his dependent, rather than the fact that she was a co-
owner and an occupier of the property in her own right.53 Although the reasoning was 
clearly influenced by the court’s desire to protect the matrimonial home, it seems odd, 
particularly in the context of a property law provision, that her interest was 
represented in terms of gender and marriage, rather than her own property ownership 
or independent occupation. The philosophy of dependency underpinning this 
approach was further highlighted in Balcombe LJ’s suggestion that sale of the 
property should generally be postponed until: ‘…her death, remarriage, voluntary 
removal from the premises or becoming dependent on another man…’54  
(b) Family Home: Themes and Issues  
Across the gamut of these creditor/occupier contests, a number of common 
themes emerge. Although disputes are generally determined according to general 
property law provisions, the policies which have emerged in their application reveal 
the ‘added value’ implicitly attached to family homes. However, the discussion above 
has also revealed a number of practical weaknesses in this analysis, along with some 
broader difficulties associated with the rationale of the family home framework. 
Firstly, a focus on family home requires a definition of ‘family’. The specific policies 
 13
discussed above generally correlate ‘family home’ with ‘matrimonial home’ – a 
property occupied by spouses. The matrimonial homes provisions, the pre- and post-
Boland discourses, and section 335A of the Insolvency Act 1986 all defined a ‘family 
home’ as a property occupied by spouses. This bias towards matrimonial rather than a 
more broadly defined family home, or, indeed, home per se, was also evident in the 
case law pertaining to charging orders, which based the protection of the debtor’s wife 
on her status as a spouse, rather than her occupation of the property as a home, or, 
indeed, her ownership interest.55 A cynical commentator might suggest that the 
exclusion of non-marital families from these policies has not been highly significant, 
owing to the general ineffectiveness of these ‘protections’ against third parties. 
Nevertheless, from a conceptual as well as a practical perspective, the narrow view of 
family adopted for these purposes raises a number of crucial issues. 
One such issue concerns the prevalence of dependency arguments in the 
bankruptcy and the charging orders provisions. This paternalistic view of a dependent 
woman, supported by a breadwinning man, is rooted in the legal disabilities 
historically imposed on married women, who could not hold property in their own 
right and were rendered dependent on the common law duty of a husband to maintain 
his wife. Although protectionist approaches can sometimes be justified as ‘redressing 
the balance’ of social and economic inequality,56 Bottomley has argued that: 
‘…whilst we must recognize the structural inequalities that women suffer from, any 
legal strategies developed as an attempt to mitigate this must not reproduce models of 
dependency.’57 In family property terms, this can been characterized as the choice 
between recognizing the economic vulnerability of women, and so regarding the 
husband’s property in ‘more familial terms’, and treating women and men within 
family units as separate individuals, with independent interests and claims to the 
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property.58 The application of family unit analyses in domestic property disputes have 
tended to cast the ‘poor innocent wife’ as a dependent, and while this approach could 
be potentially useful when considering the needs of children, in the case of adult 
occupiers it is undesirable.    
A further criticism to be made of the focus on family unit rather than 
individual occupiers of the home - whether within a family context or not – is the 
tendency of policies regulating protection of the owner-occupied home to render 
certain individuals – often the debtor’s wife and/or children – ‘invisible’ in the eyes of 
the law. The ‘collateral purpose’ doctrine in the context of orders for sale of the 
family home illustrated this effect. When developing and applying the collateral 
purpose doctrine, the court focused on the purpose of occupation as a family home. 
This focus on the family unit, rather than on individual family members, meant that 
once one partner (the husband) had left the home, the family unit was broken. 
Consequently, family members who remained in the home could not argue their 
individual independent status as occupiers of the property.59 Even where the husband 
had not left the home, but had incurred a debt secured against his interest in the 
property,60 this action was regarded as defeating the collateral purpose of occupation 
as a family home. ‘Family unit’ analysis also implicitly presumes that ‘the family’ has 
a coherent, unitary interest in the family home, although this will clearly not always 
be the case.61 A presumption that the family unit has a single collective interest in the 
home runs the risk of rendering individuals within the family, particularly less 
powerful family members – including children - invisible, leaving their interests 
overlooked and unrepresented.  
(c) Home per se 
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Although the tendency to elevate family home over home per se has limited the extent 
to which English law has protected the individual occupier’s home, a few 
developments in recent years have suggested that this perspective is not altogether 
absent, and may be suitable for future development. The individualistic ‘home per se’ 
perspective recognizes that the (family) home is a special type of property, which 
ought to be protected over and above other types of property, because of the nature of 
the attachment which occupiers have to their homes, revolves around the relationship 
between the occupier and the property, rather than the relationship between occupiers 
inter se. Research on the meanings of home emphasizes the attachments that develop 
between individuals and their homes. Family status analysis, on the other hand, 
focuses on, and takes as its trigger, relationships between people, rather than a 
relationship between the person and the property. The home per se model was 
recently endorsed by the Law Commission for England and Wales in Sharing 
Homes.62 The Commission described its project as: ‘…centered on a belief in the 
importance of the home as property. The home is unique. It is the place where life is 
lived, it is the focus of the family, and the centre-piece of their communal security.’63 
Although the importance of family was recognized as a contextual aspect of home, the 
core principle of the project was: ‘…a belief in the importance of the home as 
property.’64 
The idea that home is not identical to other types of property also underpinned 
the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, which replaced the trust 
for sale, previously imposed on all jointly owned property, with a trust of land. The 
trust for sale presumed that the principal purpose of owning land was: ‘…as an 
investment rather than as a home, to be bought and sold as market conditions demand, 
with the beneficiaries being interested in the proceeds of sale rather than the property 
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for its own sake.’65 The shift to a trust of land was intended to acknowledge that: 
‘…most co-ownership of property is for the purpose of providing a home rather than 
for an investment.’66 The 1996 Act recognised the likelihood that jointly owned 
property was bought for occupation as a home, and the guidelines accompanying the 
court’s discretion to regulate the trust included ‘the purposes for which the property 
was acquired’. Evidence to date concerning the exercise of this judicial discretion has 
not, however, suggested that the interests of individual occupiers are likely to prevail 
over the ‘non-home’ interests of third party creditors requesting sale.67 Indeed, 
despite references to the use of property as a home in the debates preceding the 1996 
Act, the idea of conferring special status on property because it is occupied as a home 
has not generally been translated into a significant protection in the context of orders 
for sale.  
One possible exception, however, arises in cases involving child occupiers. 
The discretion to order sale set out in section 14 of the Trusts of Land and 
Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 is accompanied by guidelines set out in section 15, 
directing the court to have regard to: “…the intentions of any person (or persons) who 
created the trust; the purposes for which the property subject to the trust is held, the 
welfare of any minor who occupies or might reasonably be expected to occupy any 
land subject to the trust as his home, and the interests of any secured creditor of any 
beneficiary.” Nevertheless, in Bank of Ireland Home Mortgages Ltd v Bell,68 the 
Court of Appeal reversed a decision of the lower court, which had included the fact 
that the property was purchased as a family home, and occupied by the bankrupt’s 
former wife and child as relevant factors, along with the poor health of the bankrupt’s 
former spouse, to be taken into account when considering whether to order sale. The 
Court of Appeal held that the intention that the property should be held on trust as a 
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matrimonial home was irrelevant since Mr Bell had left the home, so that it was no 
longer a ‘family home’ when the bank sought possession. Although the interests of 
the children were not argued separately, it appeared that, notwithstanding the specific 
reference to the welfare of children in section 335A, the ‘family unit’ framework had 
been carried across through the reference to ‘the purposes for which the property 
subject to the trust is held’, and precluded consideration of the individual interests of 
Mrs Be
home f
ll and the children after Mr Bell had left the property. 
The recent decision in Edwards v Lloyd’s TSB Bank plc,69 has suggested, 
however, that ‘the interests of minor occupiers’ may carry more weight than erstwhile 
appeared to be the case, in arguments against sale. In Edwards, the court postponed 
the sale of the disputed property after balancing the interests of the debtor’s children 
in staying in their home against the creditor’s request for sale of the property. The 
decision in Edwards also suggested that, under the trusts of land legislation, in cases 
involving children, the original intentions of the parties may carry some weight. 
Furthermore, although one of the original parties – Mr Edwards – had left the family 
home, Park J held that the object of the trust was: “…no doubt to provide a 
matrimonial home for the husband, Mrs Edwards and their children.”;70 and that this 
purpose continued to operate, notwithstanding the existence of the charge or Mr 
Edward’s departure from the home. The presence of children kept the original 
purpose alive, since the court held that: “[i]n part that purpose has gone, because the 
marriage is over, but in part the purpose still survives because the house is still the 
or Mrs Edwards and the two children of the former marriage.”71  
Although this case suggests that the child occupier’s interest in the property as 
a home is generating more support within the exercise of judicial discretion, it is a 
matter of some concern that although not directly linked to ‘family status’ or a family 
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context, since the trusts of land legislation govern actions by creditors against co-
owned land but not solely owned property, neither the guidelines in section 15, nor 
the decision in Edwards are relevant where single adult households are concerned. 
Although Mrs Edwards had become a single parent by the time the dispute arose, her 
co-ownership with her ex-husband triggered the trust of land. On the other hand, 
where property is owned by a single individual, including a single parent, third party 
actions against the property are governed by a separate set of principles.  When 
dealing with solely owned property, a mortgagee has two principal options: to 
conduct an out-of-court sale, where the procedural criteria are satisfied,72 or, where 
this cannot be achieved, to seek a judicial order for the sale of the property.73 When 
the requirements for an out of court sale are satisfied – briefly, that the mortgage was 
made by deed, that the legal date of redemption has passed, and that one of three 
breaching events has taken place to render the power of sale actionable – the 
occupiers have no opportunity to defend the sale, and, as discussed below, must 
attempt to postpone the possession proceedings instead. 
When a judicial sale is requested, the court has an unfettered discretion to 
order sale, notwithstanding the objections of any person, and it has been suggested 
that: ‘[i]n exercising its discretion the court is not limited to considering financial 
matters, but can also take into account social considerations.’74 In Polonksi v Lloyd’s 
Bank Mortgages Ltd,75 for example, the court ordered sale notwithstanding the 
mortgagee’s objections that the sale of the property would not suffice to discharge the 
debt, because the mortgagor had social reasons for wanting to move to a different 
area.  The mortgagor in this case was a single mother with two small children in a 
solely owned property, and her reasons for wishing to move included her concern that 
the area she was living in was rough and undesirable, and the belief that a different 
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area would provide better schooling opportunities for her children and better job 
prospects for herself. While this authority suggested that the court might, in 
circumstances of this nature, take account of the needs of the mortgagor and her 
children, the decision in Polosnki is significantly different from that in Edwards, since 
Mrs Polonki was arguing in favour of sale,76 while Mrs Edwards wanted to avoid the 
sale of the home. For a child in a solely owned property, the fact that the property is 
their ho
od that the debtor will make repay any sums due within a 
reasonable time.  
 (3) The ‘marriage’ of family and home
me has not yet emerged as an argument against sale.  
Nevertheless, whether the creditor has an automatic right to sell the property 
or the court orders sale, the occupier may still defend the possession proceedings 
under section 36 of the Administration of Justice Act 1970. Section 36 conferred 
discretion on the court to delay repossession for a limited period of time, where the 
disputed property is a dwelling-house and: ‘…it appears to the court that in the event 
of its exercising the power the mortgagor is likely to be able within a reasonable 
period to pay any sums due under the mortgage…’.77 This provides a rare example of 
a legal context where (what are in substance) home considerations are taken into 
account. It is important, however, to bear in mind, that the conditions for the exercise 
of this discretion are strict. The court will not refuse immediate possession unless the 
debtor can show that they have the financial capability to make good on arrears within 
a ‘reasonable time’ whilst continuing to meet installments as they fall due.78 
Consequently, although section 36 appears to acknowledge the value of home per se, 
the court’s discretion is not a general discretion, under which ‘home-oriented’, or 
social factors might be taken into account, but is limited to an assessment of the 
economic likeliho
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The previous section considered the ways in which English law has responded to 
arguments in support of the family home, or even home per se, albeit within an ad hoc 
framework. It is suggested that although the tension between these approaches has 
emerged at various junctures, English law has, traditionally, implicitly preferred the 
idea that family home should be protected, over an above home per se. Nevertheless, a 
number of practical and theoretical criticisms have been made of this approach, 
ranging from the definition of the ‘family unit’, the exclusion of single adults, 
differential approaches towards children, to the assumptions the family approach 
makes about relationships within the home. The following section builds on this 
analysis by arguing that far from being an obvious or automatic association, the 
concept of family home is the product particular outmoded cultural precepts. Finally, 
it will be argued that a more individualistic ‘home per se’ approach would provide a 
more appropriate modern basis on which to construct any legal protections for 
domestic property.         
Although the etymology of words relating to family and to home tends to 
suggest a long-standing and almost instinctive association between the concepts:79  
[o]ver historical time…‘family’ and ‘home’ were overlapping concepts, but 
were by no means identical. The close identification of home with family is a 
relatively recent phenomenon that can be traced to the late eighteenth or early 
nineteenth century. The concept of the home as the family’s haven and 
domestic retreat emerged only about one hundred and fifty years ago, and was, 
initially, limited to the urban middle classes.80  
This modern concept of family home, in the sense of home as a private space for the 
family was derived from bourgeois family values,81 and was strongly influenced by 
gender roles: ‘[t]he home represented security and comfort, the woman within it was 
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the ‘Perfect Lady’, the idealized feminine wife/mother, the homemaker, the pure and 
womanly woman.’82 Home was regarded as an archetypal ‘private space’,83 within 
which a husband provided for his wife and family under a duty of support which was 
both gender-specific and patriarchal.84  
Although it might be thought that the nineteenth century concept of family 
home is no longer relevant to modern discourse, Wright’s analysis of the 
contemporary ‘home model’85 across a range of cultural contexts testifies to the 
continuing influence of ideals and expectations relating to family, gender, class on 
attitudes towards home. Webster’s work86 on the significance of home in relation to 
gender, race and identity in Britain highlighted an additional head of inequality, as the 
ideal of ‘family home’ was, on the one hand, imposed on white women,87 yet 
unavailable to black women.88 Such disparities in the availability of the culturally 
cherished ideal of ‘family home’ continue to raise important questions about the value 
of retaining the concept as a central organizing theme of legal discourse. 
Contemporary analysis of the concept of family home must of course address the 
current debate surrounding the definition of ‘family’. This debate has raised major 
legal and social policy issues, as arguments have been advanced in support of a more 
inclusive approach towards family status, based on a more functional analysis of the 
family unit. The current shift towards more inclusive approaches to family law in 
England and Wales is reflected in the proposals for Civil Registered Partnerships for 
Same-Sex couples,89 and the Law Society for England and Wales’s proposals for 
greater legal recognition of cohabitation.90 In relation to family property, both sets of 
proposals focus on claims between partners, particularly those arising at the 
termination of relationships. In this relational context it is natural and appropriate that 
 22
the legal framework adopted is a family-oriented approach, however the remit of the 
family unit is defined.  
However, the subject of third party claims to domestic property raises different 
issues which would, it is argued, be more appropriately resolved within an individual 
rather than family-unit perspective. The individualist model focuses on the 
relationship between individual occupiers and their homes rather than the (gendered, 
or dependent, or narrowly defined) relationship between the occupier and the 
owner/debtor. Property theory has traditionally attached weight to the interests of 
individual occupiers:91 it has been argued that: ‘…to achieve proper self-development 
– to be a person – an individual needs some control over resources in the external 
environment.’;92 and that: ‘[m]ost people possess certain objects they feel are almost 
part of themselves. These objects are closely bound up with personhood because they 
are part of the way we constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities in the 
world.’93 Analysis of judicial approaches towards various disputes was also applied to 
illustrate the argument that some types of property, for example the home, are 
implicitly regarded as more worthy of protection than others, as ‘property for 
personhood’, so that they: ‘…give rise to a stronger moral claim than other 
property.’94 Since the link between the person and the property is ‘personal’, this 
theory is necessarily concerned with individual interests arising by virtue of the 
individual’s relationship with the property. This again adds weight to the argument 
that, when dealing with security of tenure and attachment to home, the relevant 
relationship is that between the individual and the property, rather than relationships 
between individuals, for example within a family setting. 
A more individualist approach would not only provide a more appropriate 
framework for any ‘home’ protection, but would also avoid the difficulties inherent to 
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defining ‘family’ for the purposes of family home. The application of a ‘family unit’ 
framework necessarily excludes single people, as well as ‘non-family’ households. 
Aside from the obvious practical and social implications of such exclusions, the legal 
endorsement of this approach in the context of policies protecting the home 
undermines the importance of home for individual occupiers. Although family has 
emerged as a significant aspect of home meanings for occupiers,95 and may ‘add 
value’ to the concept of home, it is not an essential attribute. Many of the values of 
home – for example, shelter, security, privacy, identity – can be equally valued by 
those who fall outside the legal definition of ‘family’, either because their relationship 
does not meet particular criteria, or because they live alone. Furthermore, sole 
occupiers may be even more dependent on the meanings of home, such as identity, 
security and continuity, than those living together within a family. The existence of 
close relational ties within a family could enable them to bring many of their ‘home 
values’ – for example, family life, a sense of belonging, security, continuity and 
identity – to a new property.96 On this reasoning, it is perhaps arguable that since, in 
the absence of family, a single individual’s personal identity may be more closely 
bound to the property itself, the occupation of a particular property could be even 
more meaningful for single dwellers, and therefore ought to attract even greater 
weight.  
 (4) Alternative approaches: Homestead legislation 
In some jurisdictions, ‘homestead’ provisions have been developed to confer 
systematic legal protection on domestic property against third parties. These policies 
explicitly recognize the home as a site of special significance, yet although the label 
conferred on such policies suggests that it is ‘home’ per se which attracts the relevant 
protections, in reality, these policies have traditionally safeguarded only the ‘family 
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home’ against external third party claims. In New Zealand, the Joint Family Homes 
Act 1964 was intended to protect the family home against third parties. This 
protection must be triggered by registration, and only spouses can register, but once a 
property is registered, a degree of immunity is provided against the claims of 
creditors, up to a maximum sum.97 In Canada, third party claims are controlled by 
legislation in Ontario,98 British Columbia,99 Alberta,100 Manitoba,101 New 
Brunswick,102 Prince Edward Island,103 Quebec104 and Newfoundland,105 which 
generally enables non-transacting spouses to prevent unilateral dispositions of the 
family home without their consent. A ‘homestead-type’ protection was also enacted in 
Ireland by the Family Home Protection Act 1976, which was designed to protect the 
family home against dispositions by one spouse without the consent of the other.  
The legislative policy backgrounds of these provisions highlight once again 
the implications of the association between family and home. In Ireland, for example, 
the Family Home Protection Act was informed by the Irish Constitutional 
provision106 that aspires to protect the home as the seat of the family. The basis for 
this association between home and family is the presumption that: ‘…by her life 
within the home, woman gives to the State a support without which the common good 
cannot be achieved.’107 The overtly gendered reasoning behind this protection is 
clearly associated with the idea of the home as ‘a woman’s place’. In New Zealand, 
also, the Joint Family Homes system was intended to: ‘…to ensure a degree of 
security for the family home, particularly against the claims of creditors.’108 However, 
although these protections were ‘home-oriented’ – that is, they focused on the 
relationship between the occupier and the home, rather than the relationship between 
the occupiers – the ‘home’ protection was by and large restricted to spouses, thus 
excluding both non-qualifying family members and single people. This approach was 
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partially challenged in the Canadian province of Nova Scotia, where the Matrimonial 
Property Act 1989 gave homestead rights to spouses only. In Walsh v Bona109 the 
plaintiff argued that the legislation breached the equality obligation imposed by the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Although the enumerated grounds of 
discrimination in section 15 do not include marital status or sexual orientation, the 
Canadian Supreme Court has included these as ‘analogous’ grounds.110 The Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal held that this provision was in breach of the equality 
obligation, and therefore unconstitutional, since it excluded and thus discriminated 
against cohabitants. The legislature responded by enacting the Law Reform Act 2000, 
which extended the provisions of the Matrimonial Property Act to include 
cohabitants, either heterosexual or homosexual.111  
The solution in Nova Scotia was to widen access to existing family home 
protections (to a certain extent). The inclusion of conjugal cohabitants does not, 
however, resolve the issue for other individuals who live in ‘non-family households’ 
or who live alone. However, in the United States of America, where 46 out of 50 
states offer some form of Homestead exemption to protect equity in the home from 
the general reach of creditors,112 an interesting alternative model has emerged. The 
Texas Homestead exemption113 has provided one of the most generous homestead 
protections in the US since its inception in 1839 by limiting home-equity borrowing 
to payment of the purchase price, improvements or taxes due on the property. The 
interpretative commentary accompanying the Texas Constitution stated that the 
principal object of the scheme was the ‘protection of the family’. One commentator 
has highlighted the traditional family-centric approach of the US homestead schemes 
by suggesting that: ‘[i]n popular as well as legal parlance, homestead means not only 
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family home but property that is accorded particular protection because it is the 
family home.’114  
Nevertheless, judicial dicta concerning the application of the Texas homestead 
exemption suggested that although the scope of the provisions was originally limited 
to the context of marital families, even in the early years the concept of homestead 
was not inextricably bound up with the concept of family. This was most clearly 
established in Wood v Wheeler, where Chief Justice Hemphill stated that: 
[t]he object of such exemption is to confer on the beneficiary a home as an 
asylum, a refuge which cannot be invaded nor its tranquility or serenity 
disturbed, and in which may be nurtured and cherished those feelings of 
individual independence which lie at the foundation and are essential to the 
permanency of our institutions.115  
The values underpinning this dictum correlate with many of the values that emerged 
from empirical studies into individual attachment to the home.116 Furthermore, the 
court clearly framed the protection in terms of the individual’s attachment to the 
property, rather than the presence of family or relationships between the occupiers of 
the property. In Franklin v Coffee,117 the purposes of the scheme were described as: 
‘…not only to protect citizens and their families, from the miseries and dangers of 
destitution, but also to cherish and support in the bosoms of individuals, those feelings 
of sublime independence which are so essential to the maintenance of free 
institutions.’118 Considerable emphasis was placed on the security and independence 
of individuals, and the importance of protecting their home environments.  
This approach has also been reflected in developments – both judicial and 
constitutional - in the scope of the homestead protection. Although it was initially 
confined to family home, the courts gradually broadened the definition of family, 
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while the underlying individualist-orientation of the Texas provisions ultimately gave 
rise to an amendment to the Texas Constitution in 1973, which extended the contexts 
in which the homestead exemption can apply to include single adults.119 As a result, 
this homestead provision now comprehensively and systematically protects the homes 
of both individuals and family units. The family unit is identified according to 
relationships of care and dependence rather than status.120 Furthermore, even where 
the ‘family’ home is protected, the central organizing concept is the value of home per 
se: in order to establish ‘membership’ of the family, an individual does not need to 
show economic support as evidence of a relationship of care and dependence, but use 
and occupation of the property as a home.121     
 (5) Family home or home per se: evaluating the options 
When evaluating the legal protection of occupiers in domestic property, it is important 
to bear in mind the overarching policy trend of English law towards creditor/occupier 
disputes. Even after the arguments surrounding the protection of family units versus 
individual occupiers are unpacked, evaluated and rendered conceptually sound, the 
apparently unshakable pro-creditor stance adopted by the English courts when 
balancing these claims presents an enduring practical obstacle to real recognition of 
the value of home in this context. The successful development of a more systematic 
approach to the protection of the home in law must be premised upon acceptance of 
the proposition that home has some meaning in law outside its economic value as a 
source of capital. In Texas, for example, the generosity of the homestead legislation 
evolved from its historical background as a frontier society, where the value of home 
as a home was recognised, alongside the broader economic consequences of loss of 
home through repossession:  
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[t]he homestead exemption…had a three-fold purpose: (1) to encourage 
colonization, for in a frontier society, each pioneer family was of definite 
value to the community; (2) to provide the debtor with a home for his family 
and some means to support them and to recoup his economic losses so as to 
prevent the family from becoming a burdensome charge upon the public; (3) 
to retain in pioneers the feeling of freedom and sense of independence which 
was deemed necessary to the continued existence of democratic institutions.122 
Homestead provisions in the USA operate by restricting the use of the home as 
security for the purposes that are not directly linked to the acquisition or improvement 
of property itself, and exempting the property from actions to recoup other, unsecured 
debts. The argument that the use of the home as security for business loans should not 
necessarily be encouraged or facilitated has been raised in the English context.123 
Arguments against the protection of the home in English law have included the 
assumption that creditors would not lend money if more effective remedies were 
extended to home occupiers. However, creditors are in the business of lending money, 
the risk of default is inherent to the nature of that business,124 and creditors are in a 
much stronger position than occupiers when it comes to taking steps to protect their 
interests, particularly when we ‘count’ children as individual occupiers.125 
Furthermore, the broader social and economic costs of repossession126 add weight to 
the argument that the interests of creditors should not be presumed to outweigh the 
home interests of occupiers, but that their respective interests should be evaluated 
within a more systematic framework.  
The development of a systematic approach would necessitate a more explicit 
policy in support of either: the family unit in a family home; individuals in a family 
home; or individual home occupiers. From an instrumentalist perspective, the concept 
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of family home is attractive, since the idea[l] of ‘family home’ is a powerfully 
emotive idiom, with considerable cultural kudos, and, as such, may be regarded as 
carrying significant weight in policy debates. ‘Family’ is clearly associated with 
‘home’ in the popular consciousness, and this is reflected in the tendencies towards 
family home discussed in earlier sections. Furthermore, although the analysis in 
section 2 indicated that the ‘family’ dimension has been problematic in the legal 
context of repossession cases, family policy advocates could regard an ostensible 
‘rejection’ of the family interest in the home as a high-risk and undesirable strategy, 
leaving them reluctant to cede any ground here, particularly at a time when the 
rhetoric of equality is gaining ground in other family policy debates.127 From a 
principled perspective, it is also important to bear in mind that empirical research has 
shown that family (in the non-legal sense of the term) is a significant factor in home 
attachments.128  
An alternative approach would be to focus on the interests of individual 
occupiers in their homes. The advantages of individually-oriented rather than family 
unit-focused approaches to issues of family policy have attracted some debate in 
recent years. In Britain it has been argued that: ‘[t]he fundamental dilemma for 
government at the end of the twentieth century has become how far it can or should 
treat adult family members as independent individuals.’;129 while the movement 
towards a more ‘individual rights’ approach for adults and children in family law and 
policy in the US has been described as: ‘…the most important event that has occurred 
in family law that has affected family relationships in the last fifty years’130 From a 
broad family policy perspective, some concerns have been raised about the 
appropriateness of individual-oriented approaches in family contexts, where family 
members may not, in reality, be autonomous individuals.131 It has been suggested 
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that: ‘[a]t first blush, the focus on individual rights may seem to diminish family 
relationships, perhaps even pitting one family member against another…’132 Katz 
argues, however, that the individual-oriented approach to family life can more 
properly be regarded as a positive recognition of ‘individual rights’ rather than selfish 
‘individualism’.133 In the context of creditor/occupier disputes, an individual rights 
approach to retaining the home would recognise the interests of individuals who have 
erstwhile been ignored in the context of such disputes. Since the effect would be to 
strengthen the claim of the individual family member against an external third-party, 
rather than to pit individual family members against each other, the effect would be to 
enhance individual rights, rather than promoting ‘individualism’ within the family 
unit.  
In one sense, the ‘family unit’ approach may be regarded as a convenient 
means to distinguish between ‘wrongdoers’, ie the debtor him/herself, and ‘victims’ 
of the debtor’s default, and determining which non-debtor occupiers should be 
included within any protection. Although the Texas ‘individual-approach’ extends to 
single member households – in which case the sole occupier would also be the debtor 
- the idea of conferring protection on debtors against their own default is unlikely to 
generate support in this jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the individual-oriented approach 
could be molded to serve a range of policy ends. For example, if, as a matter of 
policy, it were considered desirable to prioritise the protection of a debtor’s partner 
and/or children in the home, this could be achieved by an ‘individuals in the context 
of the family home’ approach, rather than conferring equal protections on all 
individual occupiers. As the Law Commission acknowledged in Sharing Homes, a 
systematic framework within which all occupiers are treated the same overlooks the 
reality that some occupiers seem more deserving of protection than others: ‘[t]here 
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can be little doubt that a court would instinctively have greater sympathy for the 
unmarried mother…than for the child of elderly parents…’134 Although the traditional 
‘family unit’ analysis has been exclusionary, and children have not counted for the 
purposes of a property-owning family, the idea of family context could be drafted to 
take account of meanings of the home to a range of individual occupiers, including 
partners, single parents, and child occupiers.   
A heterogeneous approach towards the legal protection conferred on 
individual occupiers in their homes could also be justified on the basis that not all 
occupiers value their homes in the same way. Different individuals may have different 
levels of attachment to their properties. For instance, Wikstrom’s research indicated 
that while: ‘[i]n some cases these bonds [to the home] seemed to be so strong, that 
breaking them by moving would lead to disaster [while] [f]or some young people, the 
flat was just a place where they slept and stored their belongings.’135 A more impact-
sensitive approach would focus on the effects of repossession and loss of home on the 
occupier(s), not only from a shelter perspective, but also in relation to psychological 
and emotional attachment.  Alternatively, the relative status of individual occupiers 
could be approached from a welfare perspective by focusing on those who are 
regarded as being most in need of protection. This would enable a more 
individualized approach to be pursued, with any protection based on individual needs 
and attachment, yet could provide an avenue by which the concerns of family 
advocates, particularly in relation to children could be met. Children could be counted 
as ‘individuals’ for these purposes,136 as could single people, including, for example, 
an elderly widowed person living alone or a single custodial parent.137  
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 (6) Conclusions 
The home is a site of major importance in people’s lives, whether they share their 
homes with a partner, children, extended family, friends, or whether it is even with a 
dog, cat or goldfish. When legal processes are called upon to determine whether or 
not an occupier will lose that home, any decision making should be carried out with 
an understanding of the complex interests at stake. The home is a special type of 
property, to which occupiers may develop strong personal attachments. Occupiers 
value their homes in a range of ways, not only as a source of shelter but as a particular 
type of territory where interaction with family and friends takes place, inculcating 
values such as security, privacy, and identity. English law has no explicit scheme to 
confer special protection on the home, yet the significance of home - or at least the 
family home - is reflected, to some extent, in the ad hoc policies discussed above. The 
desire to protect the family home has clearly influenced various aspects of the 
property law provisions regulating owner-occupied property in the context of default 
and/or bankruptcy. The close cultural association between ‘family’ and ‘home’ seems 
to have placed the ‘family home’ at the center of debates and policies concerned with 
the values of home. The emphasis on family home has, however, had significant 
implications on the nature and effectiveness of policies attempting to safeguard the 
home, particularly against third parties. The identification of the family home as the 
unit for protection, rather than the interests of individual occupiers in ‘hanging on to 
their homes’, has, however, resulted in policies that are not only ineffective, but also 
vulnerable to criticisms of gender discrimination and paternalism. Other issues raised 
by the centrality of the family unit in policies regulating home include the difficulties 
associated with defining a ‘family unit’, and the inherently exclusionary nature of any 
legal definition of family. There is also a further danger that the interests of some 
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family members, particularly women and children, may be overlooked or even 
ignored, because of the focus on the family unit rather than individual members of the 
family. Finally, the ‘marriage’ between the concepts of family and home has historic 
connotations linked with gender, class and race, which could be regarded as 
undermining the concept of home as a set of meanings that can be experienced, and 
valued, by all occupiers.  
These criticisms of the ‘family home’ framework must, however, be balanced 
against empirical research which indicates that changes in family roles and structures 
have not diminished the association between family and home. Conversely, it is 
suggested that: ‘[a]lthough the form of the family is undergoing change, the idea of 
family remains fundamental. By its association with family, the home…hold[s] 
cultural centrality.’138 The idea of adding value to the meaning of home because of 
the presence of family is supported by empirical research indicating that for those who 
live in a ‘family’ home, the ‘family dimension’, and particularly the presence of 
children, are significant elements of the home experience. Saegert and Winkel capture 
this view in their description of the home as: ‘…the place where the cultural values of 
individualism and achievement can be laid aside for a time. The family and personal 
relationships become the focus rather than the individual.’139 Nevertheless, the 
proposition that ‘home equals family home’ is incomplete. While family may be 
regarded as ‘adding value’ to the meanings of home, many of the values represented 
by homes: material shelter; security; control; orientation in space; permanence; 
continuity; privacy; self-identity; are not dependent on the presence of family. These 
meanings can also be experienced and valued on an individual level and the absence 
of family does not relegate home to a meaningless, valueless entity. Furthermore, 
cross-cultural research on people’s responses to their home environments has shown 
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that while: ‘…home can symbolize security and warmth or gender roles and 
domesticity, or even tyranny through domination or abuse[…]Whatever the concept 
of home, it is an individual meaning, often concerned with family, that is expressed in 
culturally recognized ways.’140 Although family values are often associated with 
home meanings, home remains meaningful for individuals as well. When 
conceptualizing home, it is therefore important not to lose sight of the meanings of 
home for individuals, whether within a family unit or not.  
There are strong arguments in support of the development of a coherent legal 
concept of home, which would enable the meanings and values of home to play a role 
in informing legal decision-making.141 In the context of disputes between creditors 
and occupiers, the fact that an occupier is attached to their home may not be regarded 
as sufficiently significant to justify exempting the home from repossession, or even 
successfully swinging the balance away from the creditor’s financial claim in all (or 
many?) cases. Nevertheless, a clearer understanding of the values represented by the 
home could justify subjecting certain decisions to stricter scrutiny. Although ‘family’ 
is a key aspect of these home values, it is not the exclusive source of meaning in the 
home, yet a concept of home that is closely intertwined with family may undervalue 
the range of individual meanings that home represents to occupiers. On the other 
hand, a more individualistic approach could still allow for ‘added value’ to be 
imputed in certain cases, possibly where the individual home occupiers include 
children. It would be preferable, however, if home values are taken into account in the 
context of legal decision making, for any weight attributed to home to be based on 
individual attachments to the home. Focusing on the individual’s relationship with the 
property rather than family status would also enable the legal concept of home to 
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reflect more accurately the values associated with occupiers’ attachments to their 
homes.  
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